New York State and City Human Rights Laws Require Interactive Process on Disability Accommodation

August 24, 2009

A New York appellate court has held that an employer’s alleged failure to consider providing additional unpaid medical leave beyond that required under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the employer’s leave policies violated the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws.  Phillips v. City of New York, 2009 NY Slip Op 05990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. July 28, 2009). The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, allowing the case to proceed to trial.

Background

The allegations are straight-forward.  Plaintiff Deborah Phillips worked for the New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) in a non-competitive civil service title.  She was granted 12 weeks’ medical leave under the FMLA, until October 30, 2006, due to a serious medical condition (cancer).  On August 11, Phillips requested and was denied leave for one full year.  DHS told her that her 12-week FMLA medical leave was exhausted and that as an “employee in a non-competitive title,” she was ineligible for additional unpaid medical leave, which is “only granted to permanent civil service employees, per the … Plan.”

On October 16 and 27, DHS informed Phillips that if she did not return to work by October 30, she would be subject to disciplinary action or discharge.  At or about this time, Phillips modified her request for leave, asking the DHS if she could obtain any further medical leave extension.  Her request was denied and she was told that failure to return to work as scheduled would terminate her employment and medical benefits.

Phillips did not return to work and was terminated.  She then sued the City and DHS, alleging that: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the State and City HRLs; (2) her request for an extension of medical leave sought a reasonable accommodation under those statutes; and (3) the defendants violated the statutes by denying her request and terminating her employment.  Phillips sought reinstatement to her former position with full back pay retroactive to November 1, 2006, with prejudgment interest, and compensatory and punitive damages.

Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that she failed to allege facts demonstrating that her cancer falls within the definition of “disability” under the State or City HRL.  It court said that Phillips did not allege she intended to return to work, or that she would be able to perform the essential functions of her job, at the end of the requested leave period.  The complaint, the lower court found, “sets forth only the untenable claim that DHS was required to accommodate plaintiff by holding her job open indefinitely,” and this was insufficient for a disability claim discrimination under the State and City HRLs.

Proceedings before the Appellate Court

Phillips appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department, arguing that she had a “disability” under the State and City HRLs and the trial court failed to address whether the defendants violated the HRLs by denying her request for an extension of unpaid medical leave, based on a uniform leave policy denying such to noncompetitive employees, without considering the feasibility of her request for a reasonable accommodation.  The appellate court agreed with plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s “Disability”

The Court reversed the lower court’s determination that the plaintiff’s complaint insufficiently alleged a “disability” under the HRLs.  Under the State HRL, a “disability” is “a physical, mental or medical impairment … which, upon the provision of reasonable accommodations, do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held.”   The Appellate Division determined that Phillips sufficiently alleged a “disability” because she claimed that upon being provided additional leave, she could perform the essential functions of her job, a requirement under the statute having a “disability.” 

Similarly, the Court determined that Phillips sufficiently alleged a “disability” under the City HRL, where disability is based only on an individual having an impairment, regardless of the ability to perform a job’s essential functions.

Need to Conduct an Individualized Assessment

The Court next considered the plaintiff’s argument that the lower court failed to address whether the defendants violated the State and City HRLs by denying her request for an extension of unpaid medical leave.  Holding that the uniform application of a leave policy alone was an insufficient basis to deny Phillips an extension of unpaid leave, the Court determined that the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged the defendants violated the affirmative obligation under the HRLs to provide reasonable accommodation.  Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent and noting “the need for individualized inquiry when making a determination of reasonable accommodation is deeply embedded in the fabric of disability rights laws,” the Appellate Division found the defendants “failed to engage in the required individualized process when considering [the plaintiff’s] request for extended medical leave, i.e., for reasonable accommodations.”  The Court said, “Rather than operating on generalizations about people with disabilities, employers (and courts) must make a clear, fact-specific inquiry about each individual’s circumstance.”  This requires the employer to “engage in a good faith interactive process ….”

Significantly, the Appellate Division noted that the defendants “cannot avoid engaging in the interactive process contemplated by both [state and city] statutes by citing their policy that employees in a ‘non-competitive’ title, such as [the plaintiff], are not allowed medical leave beyond the original 12-week medical leave granted pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act.”  An employer cannot abrogate the requirements of the law by carving out a class of employees who are not subject to an interactive process.

The Court was not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s request for one year of leave was open-ended or per se unreasonable.  While recognizing that a request for a one-year leave may not be a reasonable accommodation in “a great many cases,” it “specifically decline[d] to hold . . . that such a request cannot be a reasonable accommodation,” in circumstances, like those alleged by Phillips, where no “individualized, interactive fact-specific process” occurred addressing whether the leave request would have been effective to enable her to return to work or would pose an undue hardship on the defendants.

Greater Obligations for Reasonable Accommodations under City HRL

The Court also highlighted that the reasonable accommodation obligation under the City HRL was significantly broader than the Americans with Disabilities Act or the State HRL. The Court concluded that, unlike the State HRL, under the City HRL, there is “no subset of persons with disabilities not included among the persons referenced in the affirmative obligation” to provide a reasonable accommodation.  No accommodation (including indefinite leave time or any other need created by a disability) is “categorically excluded from the universe of reasonable accommodation.”  And, unlike the ADA, there are no accommodations that may be “unreasonable” if they do not cause undue hardship.  Essentially, undue hardship is the only exception to an employer’s obligation to provide job accommodations under the City HRL.  An employer has the burden to prove undue hardship under the City HRL.  

Accordingly, the Court reversed dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

* * *

Phillips is significant because it clarifies a New York employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process to explore job accommodations and the potential broad scope of the accommodation obligation, particularly under the City HRL.  Employers, especially those in New York City, are reminded of the need to conduct an individual, fact-specific interactive process to assess an employee’s request for a job accommodation for a medical condition.  Employers should consider: (1) written procedures for an interactive process, and (2) forms to establish its efforts to explore reasonable accommodations and to defend the outcome based on individual, specific facts of an employee’s request.  Given the complexities involved in managing employee disability and leave issues, employers would be well-served to address specific scenarios with the assistance of counsel.  Jackson Lewis attorneys are available to assist employers with this and other workplace requirements.